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Abstract: Spain is one of the largest seafood markets in Europe and the world. Seafood 
consumption has traditionally been very high in Spain; in 2005, for instance, around 36.7 
kg per capita were consumed (MAPA, several years). However, little attention has been 
paid to the market and how the different levels of the market chain interact. This paper uses 
weekly data to analyse the price transmission elasticity of the main twelve seafood products 
in the Spanish market chain (Ex-vessel, Wholesale and Retail stages). We then investigate 
the price transmission asymmetry in these market stages. The results have significant 
implications for demand analysis, market power and margins in the seafood value chain.  
JEL Classification: Q22, Q11, L11. 
Keywords: price transmission, market power, asymmetry, seafood products.  
 
Resum: Espanya es un dels principals mercats de productes pesquers d’Europa i el món. El 
consum de productes pesquers ha estat tradicionalment molt important a Espanya (en 2005 
es varen consumir al voltant de 36,7 kg per persona) (MAPA, diversos anys). Malgrat això, 
el mercat i cóm interactuen els diversos nivells de la cadena de comercialització han gaudit 
de poca atenció. En aquest estudi, utilitzant dades setmanals, s’analitza per als dotze 
principals productes pesquers l’elasticitat en la Transmissió de preus al llarg de la cadena 
de comercialització a Espanya (llotja, mercat central i detallista). Finalment s’investiga la 
presencia d’asimetria en la transmissió de preus entre aquests nivells de mercat. Els 
resultats obtinguts tenen importants implicacions a l’hora d’analitzar la demanda, poder de 
mercat i marges al llarg del mercat per als productes pesquers.  
Paraules clau: transmissió de preus, poder de mercat, asimetria, productes pesquers. 
Introduction 
 
Spain is one of Europe’s largest seafood markets. Its consumption levels 
are high, as witnessed by the high volume of fish caught and imported. Seafood 
consumption in Spain was about 36.7 kg per capita in 2005. 
Although several studies of species, fleets and their production have been 
carried out, little attention has been paid to the Spanish market and to how the 
different levels of the market chain interact. 
The 12 fresh seafood species (hake, small hake, sardine, anchovy, 
mackerel, blue whiting, horse mackerel, megrim, salmon, trout, striped venus 
and Mussels) analysed in this study are the main fish species consumed in Spain. 
These 12 products account for 60% of the total amount of fresh seafood sold in 
all the wholesale markets, and for 40% of the total value. 
We used 104 weekly observations between 2005 and 2006 to investigate 
the presence of market power by analysing elasticity and asymmetry in the price 
transmission of fresh seafood products among the Farm, Wholesale and Retail 
stages of the market chain in Spain. 
The results have significant implications for demand analysis and margins 
in the seafood value chain. 
 
Methodology 
 
The relationships between two stages in the value chain, based on a 
simultaneous equilibrium, have been described by the theory of derived demand. 
The demand equation and the supply equation are derived from the profit 
maximisation problem facing the agent at the highest and the lowest level 
respectively. The interaction of derived supply and primary demand at the retail 
level determines the retail price, while the interaction between primary supply 
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and derived demand at the producer level determines the producer price. The 
difference between the retail and producer price is the margin (or marketing 
margin) (Hicks, 1956; Gardner 1975). 
However, these estimates require high levels of data, and in practice they 
are often impossible to perform (Asche et al., 2002). Therefore, only the prices 
at the different levels of the market chain are usually analysed, especially for 
primary products, as can be seen in Goodwin & Holt (1999), Miller & Hayenga 
(2001), Asche et al. (2002), etc. 
The analysis carried out by George & King (1971) on a large number of 
commodities shows that linkages between a product’s prices (margins) 
throughout the market chain often involve a constant combination of both 
absolute and percentage margins. The justification for this pricing up 
(establishing margins) is mainly empirical, as described in Thomsen (1951), 
Buse & Brandow (1960), Dalrymple (1961), Shepherd (1962) and Waugh 
(1964). 
Therefore, the price of a certain product at a certain level in the value 
chain can be expressed as a function of the price of the same product at a 
different level of the value chain, as shown in Equation 1: 
Pr = c + b · Pf  (Eq. 1) 
Where Pr is the retail price, Pf is the ex-vessel (first-sale) price; c stands 
for a constant mark-up and b for a proportional mark-up. 
 
Causality 
Numerous studies have investigated the direction of price influences 
(causality) on market stages in the food and commodities markets. Most of the 
literature on fresh product markets states that, in the long-run, the causal relation 
is a priori considered to be upward (from the retail to the production sector). In 
the short-run, variations in the upstream (production level) prices precede 
changes in the downstream (retail) level prices. 
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However, special attention should be paid to the wholesale market stage, 
which is often neglected in two-stage market chain analyses. It is important to 
consider a three-stage market chain in analyses, since the wholesale stage has 
been shown to be an important factor in price responses (Ward, 1982), affecting 
prices at both the retail and first-sale stages. This was illustrated in Ward (1982), 
who considered the shipping point price instead of the farm or ex-vessel price in 
the first-sale stage. Some studies show that wholesale markets influence prices 
at other stages of the market chain (Bernard & Willet, 1996), since the 
wholesale market is often the place where the largest amount of supply and 
demand is met. 
An exogeneity (or causality) test is required to analyse the direction of the 
influences between market levels. In this paper, we use the well-known Granger 
Causality Tests (Granger 1969), which have already been employed to analyse 
price transmission among market stages (Ward, 1982; Tiffin & Dawson, 2000; 
Jiménez-Toribio, et al., 2003; García del Hoyo, 2002; Bakucs & Ferto, 2005; 
etc.). 
 
Elasticity of price transmission 
Following George & King’s (1971) approach, the elasticity of price 
transmission between two stages of the market chain can be estimated. George 
& King (1971, p.61) define the elasticity of price transmission as “the ratio of 
relative change in retail price to the relative change in the farm-level price”. 
Likewise, Hildreth & Jarrett (1995) define the elasticity of price transmission as 
“the relative change in retail price to the relative change in producers’ price 
when other factors affecting processors behaviour are held constant”. 
Thus, the elasticity of price transmission measures the percentage change 
in the price at a certain stage of the market chain, in relation to the relative 
change in the price of the same product at a different stage in the market chain. 
In this paper, the elasticity of price transmission is measured between the first-
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sale and wholesale stages, the first-sale and retail stages and the wholesale and 
retail stages. 
The elasticity of price transmission between two stages of the market 
chain can be calculated as: 
r
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 can be obtained by estimating the regression that 
relates retail and ex-vessel prices (Equation 1). When the variables are 
considered in their log form, the regression coefficients are equal to the 
elasticity of price transmission. 
 
Long-run price transmission coefficients 
Often, price transmission elasticities do not fully reveal the extent of price 
changes at a certain stage, due to changes in the price at another stage of the 
market chain. This is because price changes are not fully transmitted through the 
different levels of the market chain in the same time period. Usually, price 
change adjustment between market levels takes several periods. Thus, a static 
approach to price transmission elasticities is often inappropriate. 
Therefore, Von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) distinguished between short-run 
elasticity, which measures the speed of reaction of a price to a change in the 
leading price, and long-run elasticity, which describes the total magnitude of this 
reaction. 
The literature provides explanations for this lag between different market 
chain stages: 
• Heien (1980) and Worth (1999) state that repricing may be costly 
due to the time required to put on new labels, and to the loss of 
goodwill from consumers who want stability in prices. In this 
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respect, Balke & Fomby (1997) indicate that the fixed costs of 
adjustment may prevent economic agents from adjusting prices 
continuously. Therefore, adjustments only take place when 
deviation from the equilibrium exceeds a critical threshold. In such 
cases, the benefits of adjustment exceed the costs and motivate 
economic agents to move the system back into equilibrium. 
• Heien (1980) also points out the importance of storage in price 
transmission. Wohlgenant (1989) showed that inventory holding by 
retailers explains much of the delay in price adjustment between 
wholesale and retail. 
• Ward (1982) mention the perishable nature of products, which 
leads retailers to delay the transmission of upstream price rises in 
the fear that they will not be able to sell their whole stock. 
• Brorsen et al. (1985) introduce risk into the analysis. 
• Kinnucan & Forker (1987) suggest that market power and the way 
data are processed could be two other reasons for lagged price 
transmission. 
 
Price transmission asymmetry 
In the literature, the analysis of price transmission asymmetries is often 
related to market power. Thus testing for the existence of price transmission 
asymmetries is often used to investigate the existence of market power. Market 
power may be used at some stage in the market chain to avoid fully transmitting 
decreases in supply price, whilst perfectly transmitting price increases. 
Therefore, price transmission asymmetry may be a source of distortion in 
the transmission of information throughout the stages of the market chain. This 
may lead to inefficiencies in the market, preventing optimal allocation. In this 
respect, an increase in primary production would be associated with a decrease 
in the input price. If this price decrease is not fully transmitted to the retail level, 
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then the retail price may be higher than the market clearing price, leading to 
excess production. 
Moreover, the presence of asymmetry in vertical price transmission is 
often considered collusive behaviour. This may be reinforced in some food 
sectors, as the retail and wholesale stages seem to be more concentrated than the 
production stage. 
However, explanations other than market power have been given for 
asymmetric price transmission. These include inventor holding and valuation 
(Wright & Williams, 1982 and Wohlgenant, 1989), the perishable nature of 
goods (Ward, 1982), public intervention (Kinnucan & Forker, 1987), the 
existence of repricing costs (Worth, 1999), price expectations (Aguiar & 
Santana, 2002), etc. 
In order to investigate the presence of price transmission asymmetry, we 
followed a similar methodology to that used by Houck (1977). Houck’s method 
was based on the earlier works of Farrel (1952), Tweeten & Quance (1969) and 
Wolffram (1971) and subsequently used by Ward (1982) to capture the 
dynamics of price transmissions between market stages. 
In order to investigate the presence of price transmission asymmetry, we 
estimated Equation 1, including Pf+ and Pf- variables and accounting for the 
positive and negative price changes at the first-sale stage. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, asymmetry was estimated in 
two different equations (Equations 3 and 4). Thus, the positive and negative 
price variation variables were in different equations. Houck (1977, p.571) 
addressed this problem, pointing out that “when a variable is segmented into 
increasing and decreasing components, it is possible that the two segments will 
be highly correlated with each other”. 
Pr = a + b Pf + c Pf+  (Eq. 3) 
Pr = a + b Pf + c Pf-  (Eq. 4) 
 6
where the variables accounting for the positive and negative price 
changes, used here in their absolute terms, are defined as follows: 
Pf+ = ∆ Pf = Pf – Pf-1   if ∆ Pf > 0 (Eq. 5) 
Pf- = ∆ Pf = Pf – Pf-1  if ∆ Pf < 0   (Eq. 6) 
Thus, when the coefficient c is significant (and therefore different to 0), 
there is asymmetry. 
Then, there are 4 possible cases in which “c” is significant and asymmetry 
exists: 
• “c” in Pf+ significant and >0 (+) implies that when the upstream price 
increases, the price downstream increases more than proportionally. 
• “c” in Pf+ significant and <0 (-) implies that when the upstream price 
increases, the price downstream increases less than proportionally. 
• “c” in Pf- significant and >0 (+) implies that when the upstream price 
decreases, the price downstream decreases less than proportionally. 
• “c” in Pf- significant and <0 (-) implies that when the upstream price 
decreases, the price downstream decreases more than proportionally. 
Only the estimation of price transmission asymmetry between the first-
sale and retail stages has been specified in this section. However, we also used 
analogous procedures to analyse the presence of price transmission asymmetry 
between the first-sale and wholesale stages, and between the wholesale and 
retail stages. 
 
The Data 
 
For this analysis, we used 104 weekly price observations from 2005 and 
2006 of 12 fresh seafood species at 3 different stages of the Spanish market 
chain. 
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The 12 fresh seafood species analysed (hake, small hake, sardine, 
anchovy, mackerel, blue whiting, horse mackerel, megrim, salmon, trout, striped 
venus and mussels) are the most consumed in Spain. 
Out of these 12 fresh seafood species, 8 can be considered wild fish 
species (hake, small hake, sardine, anchovy, mackerel, blue whiting, horse 
mackerel and megrim). The main production source of the other 4 species is 
aquaculture. Two of these are fish species (salmon and trout), and the other 2 are 
shellfish (striped venus and mussels). Out of the 4 farmed species, domestic 
Spanish production is the main source of trout and mussels. 
All 12 species account for 60% of the total amount of fresh seafood sold 
in all the wholesale markets, and 40% of the total value. The three different 
market chain levels (Ex-vessel, Wholesale and Retail) are the most significant 
ones. 
This wide range of species enabled us to study the Spanish seafood 
market in detail. 
The Figures below show the price evolution of the 12 seafood species at 
the three different market stages. 
 
Figure 1: Hake price evolution 
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Figure 2: Small hake price evolution 
Small hake
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Figure 3: Sardine price evolution 
Sardine
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Figure 4: Anchovy price evolution 
Anchovy
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Figure 5: Mackerel price evolution 
Mackerel
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Figure 6: Blue whiting price evolution 
Blue whiting
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Figure 7: Horse mackerel price evolution 
Horse mackerel
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Figure 8: Megrim price evolution 
Megrim
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85 92 99
Ex-vessel
Wholesale
Retail
 
Figure 9: Salmon price evolution 
Salmon
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Figure 10: Trout price evolution 
Trout
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Figure 11: Striped venus price evolution 
Stripped venus
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Figure 12: Mussel price evolution 
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These figures indicate that the different fresh seafood species’ prices 
follow different evolution patterns. 
Moreover, prices for wild species at the Ex-vessel and Wholesale stages 
show high variability and similar trends. Prices at the retail stage present lower 
variations. This can be explained by the existence of more available substitutes 
and sources as well as higher costs other than raw fish at the downstream (retail) 
stage. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that aquaculture species farmed at the 
domestic level show lower volatility levels. This may be due to the more regular 
seafood supply and the lower risks. Moreover, variations increase as products 
move down the market chain (retail). 
For a more formal and in-depth analysis, some descriptive statistics 
(mean, standard deviation and the coefficient of variation) for the prices of the 
12 seafood species at the 3 different market stages are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 12 fresh seafood species analysed 
  Ex-vessel   Wholesale   Retail  
 Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV 
Hake 7.34 2.10 28.61 9.35 2.03 21.74 17.43 0.82 4.71
Small hake 4.02 0.90 22.50 5.50 1.11 20.24 10.64 0.45 4.22
Sardine 0.80 0.23 28.38 1.55 0.21 13.73 3.44 0.10 2.91
Anchovy 3.11 0.79 25.39 3.94 0.75 18.99 7.30 0.53 7.25
Mackerel 0.90 0.41 45.57 1.82 0.37 20.57 3.72 0.18 4.78
Blue whiting 0.96 0.27 27.66 1.51 0.30 20.09 3.54 0.12 3.30
Horse mackerel 0.83 0.30 36.64 2.61 0.39 15.01 4.57 0.18 4.03
 10
Megrim 5.36 1.15 21.37 6.34 1.21 19.15 12.14 0.68 5.61
Salmon 3.63 0.74 20.30 4.55 0.77 16.94 8.33 0.71 8.49
Trout 1.68 0.12 7.15 2.46 0.23 9.39 4.37 0.26 5.90
Striped venus 2.60 0.71 27.16 4.35 0.68 15.55 8.92 1.20 13.46
Mussels 1.05 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.05 2.97 3.03 0.04 1.22
 
The data in Table 1 supports previous conclusions. For wild species, the 
price variability (coefficient of variation) decreases as the product goes down 
the market chain (from ex-vessel to retail stages), as does the standard deviation. 
This may be due to the existence of more available substitutes and sources, 
rather than the higher costs other than raw fish at the downstream (retail) stage 
(which may lead to lower coefficient of variations, but similar standard 
deviation coefficients). In contrast, farmed species do not show a clear group 
trend. 
 
Analysis 
 
Table 2 reveals the degree of correlation between the log of the price 
series for the 12 seafood species in the 3 different market stages. 
In this Table, the 3 market stages, Ex-vessel, Wholesale and Retail, are 
coded as E, W and R respectively. Number 1 stands for hake, 2 for small hake, 3 
for sardine, 4 for anchovy, 5 for mackerel, 6 for blue whiting, 7 for horse 
mackerel, 8 for megrim, 9 for salmon, 10 for rout, 11 for striped venus and 12 
for mussels. 
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 Table 2: Correlation matrix of the log prices for the 12 seafood species in the 3 different market stages  
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
E1 1 0.38 -0.14 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.38 0.65 -0.14 0.43 -0.04 na 0.94 0.79 0.09 0.24 0.52 0.60 0.43 0.63 -0.13 0.57 -0.36 0.37 0.59 0.72 -0.14 0.44 0.53 0.42 -0.19 0.69 0.37 0.49 -0.10 -0.24
E2 0.38 1 -0.25 0.03 -0.03 0.29 0.28 0.34 -0.27 0.23 0.23 na 0.43 0.74 0.09 0.06 -0.05 0.29 0.18 0.47 -0.21 -0.07 0.17 0.11 0.42 0.19 0.01 0.15 -0.18 0.35 0.19 0.39 -0.26 -0.11 0.21 -0.12
E3 -0.14 -0.25 1 0.24 -0.03 0.17 0.00 -0.22 0.32 0.21 -0.24 na -0.23 -0.16 0.61 0.22 0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.27 0.32 -0.03 -0.06 -0.26 -0.34 -0.27 0.27 -0.23 0.04 -0.05 -0.22 -0.19 0.31 0.20 -0.10 -0.16
E4 0.35 0.03 0.24 1 0.29 0.19 0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08 na 0.16 0.17 0.38 0.85 0.25 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.55 0.30 0.19 -0.14 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.18 0.11
E5 0.34 -0.03 -0.03 0.29 1 0.07 -0.11 0.14 0.18 -0.06 -0.06 na 0.24 0.33 -0.06 0.17 0.63 0.18 -0.03 0.16 0.25 0.26 -0.15 0.18 0.27 0.25 -0.11 0.30 0.40 -0.06 -0.34 0.21 0.34 0.19 0.16 0.07
E6 0.46 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.07 1 0.41 0.46 -0.41 0.54 0.04 na 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.27 0.28 0.83 0.35 0.51 -0.42 0.07 -0.31 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.12 -0.03 0.19 0.41 0.01 0.30 -0.10 0.06 -0.42 -0.16
E7 0.38 0.28 0.00 0.08 -0.11 0.41 1 0.53 -0.40 0.41 0.31 na 0.45 0.41 0.35 0.08 0.17 0.54 0.67 0.54 -0.46 0.22 -0.08 0.19 0.33 0.46 0.14 0.00 0.37 0.60 0.24 0.47 -0.12 0.16 -0.32 -0.24
E8 0.65 0.34 -0.22 -0.04 0.14 0.46 0.53 1 -0.28 0.37 0.16 na 0.74 0.61 0.03 -0.02 0.32 0.58 0.41 0.91 -0.37 0.42 -0.30 0.20 0.37 0.59 -0.21 0.05 0.37 0.38 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.29 -0.34 -0.33
E9 -0.14 -0.27 0.32 0.08 0.18 -0.41 -0.40 -0.28 1 -0.15 -0.29 na -0.17 -0.13 -0.25 0.13 0.10 -0.34 -0.29 -0.47 0.96 0.24 -0.01 -0.37 -0.16 -0.12 -0.21 0.23 -0.04 -0.41 -0.33 -0.06 0.63 0.41 0.52 -0.15
E10 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.05 -0.06 0.54 0.41 0.37 -0.15 1 -0.13 na 0.40 0.42 0.19 0.09 0.21 0.55 0.31 0.34 -0.21 0.49 -0.43 -0.05 0.16 0.47 -0.05 0.01 0.20 0.48 -0.21 0.48 0.30 0.54 -0.31 -0.58
E11 -0.04 0.23 -0.24 0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.31 0.16 -0.29 -0.13 1 na -0.03 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.30 -0.22 -0.15 0.68 0.21 0.28 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.30 0.38 0.10 -0.36 -0.25 0.19 0.03
E12 na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na
W1 0.94 0.43 -0.23 0.16 0.24 0.42 0.45 0.74 -0.17 0.40 -0.03 na 1 0.78 0.07 0.14 0.42 0.57 0.55 0.66 -0.22 0.52 -0.38 0.35 0.54 0.71 -0.16 0.26 0.45 0.43 -0.04 0.67 0.21 0.41 -0.19 -0.29
W2 0.79 0.74 -0.16 0.17 0.33 0.40 0.41 0.61 -0.13 0.42 0.12 na 0.78 1 0.10 0.12 0.45 0.55 0.38 0.65 -0.09 0.43 -0.18 0.27 0.63 0.62 -0.10 0.34 0.34 0.49 -0.06 0.71 0.20 0.36 0.09 -0.29
W3 0.09 0.09 0.61 0.38 -0.06 0.43 0.35 0.03 -0.25 0.19 0.20 na 0.07 0.10 1 0.34 0.10 0.36 0.26 0.12 -0.21 -0.23 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.50 -0.12 0.23 0.39 0.14 0.08 -0.17 -0.13 -0.25 0.02
W4 0.24 0.06 0.22 0.85 0.17 0.27 0.08 -0.02 0.13 0.09 0.04 na 0.14 0.12 0.34 1 0.13 0.24 0.17 -0.02 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.38 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.05
W5 0.52 -0.05 0.06 0.25 0.63 0.28 0.17 0.32 0.10 0.21 0.05 na 0.42 0.45 0.10 0.13 1 0.39 0.19 0.34 0.15 0.41 -0.21 0.29 0.38 0.51 0.01 0.34 0.62 0.19 -0.22 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.06 -0.07
W6 0.60 0.29 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.83 0.54 0.58 -0.34 0.55 0.13 na 0.57 0.55 0.36 0.24 0.39 1 0.42 0.60 -0.35 0.31 -0.37 0.19 0.38 0.56 -0.08 0.14 0.45 0.58 -0.10 0.54 0.08 0.26 -0.40 -0.21
W7 0.43 0.18 -0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.35 0.67 0.41 -0.29 0.31 0.12 na 0.55 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.42 1 0.35 -0.38 0.24 -0.25 0.39 0.37 0.47 0.14 0.04 0.35 0.50 0.35 0.49 -0.13 0.17 -0.29 -0.21
W8 0.63 0.47 -0.27 0.03 0.16 0.51 0.54 0.91 -0.47 0.34 0.30 na 0.66 0.65 0.12 -0.02 0.34 0.60 0.35 1 -0.47 0.29 -0.15 0.31 0.48 0.57 -0.05 0.16 0.38 0.48 0.09 0.54 -0.09 0.10 -0.25 -0.16
W9 -0.13 -0.21 0.32 0.19 0.25 -0.42 -0.46 -0.37 0.96 -0.21 -0.22 na -0.22 -0.09 -0.21 0.17 0.15 -0.35 -0.38 -0.47 1 0.16 0.12 -0.30 -0.08 -0.16 -0.14 0.34 -0.05 -0.42 -0.34 -0.08 0.61 0.34 0.66 -0.02
W10 0.57 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.49 -0.15 na 0.52 0.43 -0.23 0.03 0.41 0.31 0.24 0.29 0.16 1 -0.51 0.00 0.33 0.66 -0.29 0.46 0.50 0.28 -0.39 0.59 0.76 0.91 -0.02 -0.57
W11 -0.36 0.17 -0.06 0.05 -0.15 -0.31 -0.08 -0.30 -0.01 -0.43 0.68 na -0.38 -0.18 0.06 0.00 -0.21 -0.37 -0.25 -0.15 0.12 -0.51 1 0.02 0.02 -0.43 0.22 0.06 -0.34 -0.17 0.40 -0.33 -0.41 -0.50 0.51 0.27
W12 0.37 0.11 -0.26 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 -0.37 -0.05 0.21 na 0.35 0.27 0.17 0.11 0.29 0.19 0.39 0.31 -0.30 0.00 0.02 1 0.56 0.38 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.25 0.33 -0.15 -0.08 0.02 0.26
R1 0.59 0.42 -0.34 0.25 0.27 0.18 0.33 0.37 -0.16 0.16 0.28 na 0.54 0.63 0.05 0.12 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.48 -0.08 0.33 0.02 0.56 1 0.66 -0.04 0.53 0.36 0.41 0.09 0.75 0.12 0.24 0.28 -0.03
R2 0.72 0.19 -0.27 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.46 0.59 -0.12 0.47 0.08 na 0.71 0.62 0.04 0.08 0.51 0.56 0.47 0.57 -0.16 0.66 -0.43 0.38 0.66 1 -0.23 0.43 0.68 0.66 -0.20 0.88 0.39 0.56 -0.18 -0.28
R3 -0.14 0.01 0.27 0.23 -0.11 0.12 0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.05 0.20 na -0.16 -0.10 0.50 0.11 0.01 -0.08 0.14 -0.05 -0.14 -0.29 0.22 0.21 -0.04 -0.23 1 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.31 -0.17 -0.30 -0.30 0.09 0.18
R4 0.44 0.15 -0.23 0.55 0.30 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.23 na 0.26 0.34 -0.12 0.38 0.34 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.34 0.46 0.06 0.28 0.53 0.43 0.01 1 0.41 0.21 -0.24 0.46 0.47 0.38 0.51 0.05
R5 0.53 -0.18 0.04 0.30 0.40 0.19 0.37 0.37 -0.04 0.20 0.13 na 0.45 0.34 0.23 0.08 0.62 0.45 0.35 0.38 -0.05 0.50 -0.34 0.35 0.36 0.68 0.06 0.41 1 0.56 -0.23 0.51 0.39 0.39 -0.16 -0.02
R6 0.42 0.35 -0.05 0.19 -0.06 0.41 0.60 0.38 -0.41 0.48 0.30 na 0.43 0.49 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.58 0.50 0.48 -0.42 0.28 -0.17 0.28 0.41 0.66 0.19 0.21 0.56 1 0.04 0.62 -0.01 0.19 -0.29 -0.17
R7 -0.19 0.19 -0.22 -0.14 -0.34 0.01 0.24 0.06 -0.33 -0.21 0.38 na -0.04 -0.06 0.14 -0.02 -0.22 -0.10 0.35 0.09 -0.34 -0.39 0.40 0.25 0.09 -0.20 0.31 -0.24 -0.23 0.04 1 -0.12 -0.68 -0.45 0.10 0.11
R8 0.69 0.39 -0.19 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.47 0.54 -0.06 0.48 0.10 na 0.67 0.71 0.08 0.20 0.41 0.54 0.49 0.54 -0.08 0.59 -0.33 0.33 0.75 0.88 -0.17 0.46 0.51 0.62 -0.12 1 0.35 0.55 -0.02 -0.32
R9 0.37 -0.26 0.31 0.31 0.34 -0.10 -0.12 0.06 0.63 0.30 -0.36 na 0.21 0.20 -0.17 0.18 0.40 0.08 -0.13 -0.09 0.61 0.76 -0.41 -0.15 0.12 0.39 -0.30 0.47 0.39 -0.01 -0.68 0.35 1 0.88 0.19 -0.39
R10 0.49 -0.11 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.41 0.54 -0.25 na 0.41 0.36 -0.13 0.15 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.10 0.34 0.91 -0.50 -0.08 0.24 0.56 -0.30 0.38 0.39 0.19 -0.45 0.55 0.88 1 0.02 -0.66
R11 -0.10 0.21 -0.10 0.18 0.16 -0.42 -0.32 -0.34 0.52 -0.31 0.19 na -0.19 0.09 -0.25 0.08 0.06 -0.40 -0.29 -0.25 0.66 -0.02 0.51 0.02 0.28 -0.18 0.09 0.51 -0.16 -0.29 0.10 -0.02 0.19 0.02 1 0.10
R12 -0.24 -0.12 -0.16 0.11 0.07 -0.16 -0.24 -0.33 -0.15 -0.58 0.03 na -0.29 -0.29 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.21 -0.21 -0.16 -0.02 -0.57 0.27 0.26 -0.03 -0.28 0.18 0.05 -0.02 -0.17 0.11 -0.32 -0.39 -0.66 0.10 1  
 
 
 12
It should be noted that the result for E12, which are mussels at the ex-
vessel stage, was not available (na), as the prices of this product were constant 
during the study period. 
The analysis considers all prices in cents, rather than euros. Therefore, 
prices were multiplied by 100 so that the log of the prices did not have a 
negative value. 
The correlation matrix in Table 2 also shows the following:  
• The high value species (hake, small hake and megrim) have 
similar trends to other species (a higher sum of correlation coefficients). 
Most of the farmed species (salmon, striped venus, and mussels) and the 
lowest value species (sardine) have the least similarities to other species. 
This may be due to the lower number of farmed and shellfish species. 
• Prices at the retail stage had more similar trends (a higher sum of 
correlation coefficients), while prices at the ex-vessel stage had less 
similar trends. 
• The degree of correlation between the ex-vessel and the 
wholesale market was higher for most of the species analysed, as can be 
seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between market stages for the 12 species 
analysed 
 E-W E-R W-R
Hake 0.94 0.59 0.54
Small hake 0.74 0.19 0.62
Sardine 0.61 0.27 0.50
Anchovy 0.85 0.55 0.38
Mackerel 0.63 0.40 0.62
Blue whiting 0.83 0.41 0.58
Horse mackerel 0.67 0.24 0.35
Megrim 0.91 0.54 0.54
Salmon 0.96 0.63 0.61
Trout 0.49 0.54 0.91
Striped venus 0.68 0.19 0.51
Mussels   0.26
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 The above Table shows that the sum of the correlation coefficients were 
higher between the ex-vessel and wholesale markets than between the wholesale 
and retail markets or the ex-vessel and retail markets. 
Moreover, there was a positive relationship between the species’ prices 
and the correlation coefficients. 
This relation between prices and correlation coefficients was stronger and 
higher in the more upstream stages. The prices and correlation coefficients 
between ex-vessel and wholesale market elasticity (relation) were 0.17, with a 
significance level (R-sq.) of 0.5. This elasticity implies that when the species 
value increased by 1%, the correlation coefficients between ex-vessel and 
wholesale markets increased by 0.17%. 
Table 4 presents the results of the Granger causality test, used to analyse 
the relation between markets for the 12 seafood species. 
 
Table 4: Granger causality test results for the 12 species analysed 
 E-W E-R W-R 
Hake  → → 
Small hake  → → 
Sardine ←  → 
Anchovy   ← 
Mackerel → → → 
Blue whiting  → → 
Horse mackerel  → → 
Megrim  → → 
Salmon  → → 
Trout ←  → 
Striped venus   → 
Mussels   
 
Where “→” stands for relations that were accepted at a 5% significance 
level. 
The above Table indicates that most of the retail prices were influenced 
by wholesale prices (10 out of 12) and by ex-vessel prices (7 out of 12). The 
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exception was anchovy, for which wholesale prices were influenced by retail 
prices. The influence between ex-vessel and wholesale markets was not as 
clearly defined. Ex-vessel prices were only influenced by wholesale prices in 2 
cases (out of 12). In contrast, mackerel wholesale prices were influenced by ex-
vessel prices. 
These results are in accordance with most of the previous literature on 
seafood and food product markets. Heien (1980) confirmed that in the short-run, 
variations in production level prices preceded changes in retail level prices in 
57% of the cases analysed. A bidirectional causal relation between the 
production and retail stages was present in 13% of the cases. Out of the 22 food 
commodities analysed using Granger-Sims causality tests, only 9% presented a 
unidirectional causal relationship from the retail to the production stage (Sims, 
1972). Freebairn (1984) used the same Granger-Sims causality tests for 17 food 
products in Australia. He found a unidirectional causal relationship from the 
production to the retail stage in 35% of cases, a unidirectional causal 
relationship (6% of the cases) from the retail to the production stage and no 
bidirectional causal relations. However, Jiménez-Toribio, et al. (2003) and 
García del Hoyo (2002) used the same Granger’s methodology and found that 
wholesale prices of red sea bream and striped venus in Spain were influenced by 
ex-vessel prices. Hartmann, et al. (2000) used cointegration and exogeneity tests 
and found that the auction (first-sale) prices of hake in France influenced both 
the wholesale and retail stages. 
Table 5 presents the results for the elasticity of price transmission, in 
which the relations among the 12 seafood species and 3 markets stages were 
analysed. 
 
Table 5: Elasticity of the price transmission for the 12 species analysed 
 E-W E-R W-R 
Hake 0.72 0.10 0.12
Small hake 0.61 0.03 0.14
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Sardine 0.25 0.01 0.11
Anchovy 0.57 0.13 0.18
Mackerel 0.31 0.04 0.14
Blue whiting 0.60 0.05 0.09
Horse mackerel 0.27 0.03 0.13
Megrim 0.80 0.15 0.17
Salmon 0.83 0.29 0.32
Trout 0.67 0.46 0.57
Striped venus 0.42 0.35 0.14
Mussels   0.12
 
This analysis of the 12 species shows that the highest elasticities of price 
transmission occurred between the ex-vessel and wholesale prices. The 
elasticities of price transmission between ex-vessel and retail prices were the 
lowest, with the exception of striped venus. 
Moreover, there was a positive relationship between the species’ prices 
and the elasticities of price transmission, especially between the ex-vessel and 
wholesale market levels. 
Table 6 shows the long-run coefficients of the price transmission 
elasticity for the 12 species analysed. 
 
Table 6: Long-run coefficients for the 12 species analysed 
 E-W E-R W-R 
Hake 0.89 (1,1) 0.22 (0,1) 0.29 (0,1) 
Small hake 1.15 (1,1) 0.20 (2,2) 0.83 (1,1) 
Sardine 0.31 (1,1) 0.04 (0,2) 0.19 (2,1) 
Anchovy 0.51 (1,1) 0.37 (0,1) 0.59 (0,1) 
Mackerel 0.42 (2,2) 0.15 (2,1) 0.28 (1,2) 
Blue whiting 0.74 (1,1) 0.17 (0,1) 0.21 (0,2) 
Horse mackerel 0.46 (1,2) 0.16 (1,2) 0.33 (1,2) 
Megrim 0.72 (1,1) 0.44 (0,1) 0.53 (0,1) 
Salmon 0.83 (1,1) 0.55 (0,3) 0.67 (0,3) 
Trout ns (0,2) 1.08 (0,3) 0.63 (1,3) 
Striped venus 0.74 (1,1) 0.47 (1,1) 0.29 (1,1) 
Mussels   0.29 (0,2) 
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Where “ns” for trout means that the result was not significant. Brackets 
show the number of significant lags for the dependent and independent terms 
respectively. 
The above Table presents the long-run coefficients for the 12 species 
analysed. It can be seen that the highest long-run coefficients were between the 
ex-vessel and wholesale prices. The coefficients between the ex-vessel and retail 
prices were the lowest, with the exception of striped venus. 
These results are in accordance with Gonzales et al. (2003), who used 
cointegration methodology. They found that the long-run relations between 
shipping and retail stages in France for cod and salmon were 0.40 and 0.54. 
Moreover, it seems that there was a positive relationship between the 
species’ prices and the long-run coefficients (as for the elasticities of the price 
transmission). 
Finally, a comparison of these results with price transmission elasticities 
(Table 5) shows that the long-run coefficients were higher than the price 
transmission elasticities (in 31 of the 33 cases analysed, and with a 20% higher 
mean). This means that the price change adjustment between market levels was 
often larger and took several periods. 
Table 7 shows the positive and negative price transmission asymmetry 
results for the 12 seafood species between the 3 markets levels. 
 
Table 7: Asymmetry for the 12 species analysed 
 E - W E - R W - R 
 Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. 
Hake   - - ++ - - ++ 
Small hake    ++ - - ++ 
Sardine ++    - - + 
Anchovy ++  - - ++ - - ++ 
Mackerel  ++  ++ - - ++ 
Blue whiting    ++ - - ++ 
Horse mackerel   - - + - - ++ 
Megrim   - - ++ - - ++ 
Salmon  ++ - - ++ - - + 
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Trout     - - ++ 
Striped venus    ++ - - ++ 
Mussels     -  
 
Where 2 positive or negative signs mean that the “c” coefficient was 
significant (therefore asymmetry exists) at a 5% level, while only one sign 
means that the coefficient was significant at a 10% level. 
These results clearly show that price transmission asymmetry is relevant 
(at least between some market levels). Asymmetry was observed in 25 of the 32 
(78.13%) relations between market stages. In addition, asymmetry was found in 
all 12 products analysed (100%). 
There was more asymmetry in our results than in those of Pelztman 
(2000) and Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), who used similar 
methodologies and revealed asymmetry in 66% (out of 285 tests) and 68% (63 
out of 93) of the cases. 
In this study, the major trends observed in the price transmission 
asymmetry results were as follows: 
• When the upstream (producer and wholesale) price decreased, 
the retail price decreased less than proportionally. 
• When the upstream price increased, the retail price increased less 
than proportionally. 
Both trends occurred together in 16 out of the 25 (64%) cases in which 
asymmetry was present. However, even when there was price transmission 
asymmetry; market power did not seem to be responsible for this behaviour. 
When upstream price decreased, the retail price decreases less than 
proportionally, which is a clear sign of market power. However, when the 
upstream price increased, the retail price increased less than proportionally. This 
is in contrast to the market power perception. 
Hence, the reason for the asymmetric price transmission seems to be 
lower volatility in the retail market stage, explained by the existence of more 
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available substitutes and sources. Another explanation for the presence of price 
transmission asymmetry could involve the repricing costs (menu costs). This 
type of price asymmetry could help to explain the existence of high margins 
between wholesale and retail, and first-sale and retail market stages. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This paper analyses the price transmission behaviour throughout the 
market chain for the twelve main seafood products consumed in Spain. We used 
2005 and 2006 weekly data in the analyses. 
Out of these 12 fresh seafood species analysed, 8 can be considered wild 
fish species (hake, small hake, sardine, anchovy, mackerel, blue whiting, horse 
mackerel and megrim). The main production source of production for the other 
4 species is aquaculture. Two of these farmed species are fish (salmon and 
trout), and the other 2 are shellfish (striped venus and mussels). Out of the 4 
farmed species, domestic Spanish production is the main source of trout and 
mussels. 
During the study, price transmission elasticity was analysed, as well as the 
long-run coefficients of price transmission elasticity and price transmission 
asymmetry for the twelve seafood products in three different market stages (Ex-
vessel, Wholesale and Retail). 
The price volatility differed between market chain levels and products 
(wild/farmed). Prices were normally less volatile in downstream levels (retail) 
and in farmed species. 
Price causality analysis confirmed that upstream levels (wholesale and ex-
vessel levels) led to changes in the downstream level (retail). However, the 
wholesale stage appeared to be the benchmark, but no strong evidence was 
found. 
 19
Price transmission elasticity showed that the retail stage was not as greatly 
affected by upstream price changes. The wholesale and ex-vessel levels are 
more closely interrelated. 
The long-run coefficients of the price transmission elasticity were higher 
than the “static” price transmission elasticities. This implies that the price 
change adjustment between market levels takes some time to be fully 
transmitted. 
Finally, price transmission asymmetry is relevant, especially when 
analysing the retail market. However, market power does not seem to explain 
this asymmetry. When the upstream price decreased, the retail price decreased 
less than proportionally, which is a clear market power sign. However, when the 
upstream price increased, the retail price increased less than proportionally. This 
contradicts the market power perception. Hence, it seems that lower volatility in 
the retail market stage—which may be due to the higher number of available 
substitutes and sources—explains the asymmetric price transmission. 
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